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ABSTRACT 
Current naval networks vary in size and implementation, but have one thing in 
common: poor network device connectivity oversight. Poor network oversight can lead to 
unauthorized network access, but there is a potential solution with software-defined 
networking (SDN). SDN technology provides the management oversight and capability 
to maintain a complete network picture of all connected devices. SDN is the network 
technology that separates the control plane from the forwarding plane of the network 
while providing ability to program the entire network from a central controller. This 
thesis reviews the current network access control solution deployed for the NPS 
unclassified network and creates a SDN solution aimed to provide improvements in the 
following areas: a centralized network topology, low management overhead, and 
reduction in hardware and operational costs. 
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This thesis evaluates how integrating software-defined networking (SDN) with virtual local
area network (VLAN) technologies can improve the performance of identifying unautho-
rized devices in an enterprise network and, therefore, improve network security.
Naval ships have large networks with many hosts and devices. Spread throughout the ship,
these hosts and devices are hard to keep track of once connected to the network. Often,
hosts must be added or moved due to operational needs. The network administrators then
go into the switches and authentication servers to add these devices manually, including
adding their physical network interface addresses and port information to authorize them
on the network. Manual configuration not only takes time, but also is error prone (e.g.,
attaching an unauthorized host to a restricted switch port). Fixing such errors after the fact
further delays operability and thus the mission. Automating the port assignment process by
implementing some type of authentication process with a network access server (NAS) is a
solution widely deployed in enterprise networks.
This thesis reviews Naval Postgraduate School’s unclassified network run by Information
Technology and Communications Services (ITACS). Their network has an automated au-
thentication process that assigns network access based off of one’s username and password,
alongwith whatever network policies for the organization and/or groups the account belongs
to in the school’s active directory (AD).
1.1 Problem Statement
The NPS network uses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.1x
authenticationmethod to automatically assign newly attachedmachines to particularVLANs
based on their physical network interface address. Although this implementation works,
other network technologies may provide a more efficient way of authentication and network
access control. SDN is a newer network technology that provides high programmability,
which allows for dynamic, agile, and flexible networks, because SDN separates the forward-
ing functions from the network control plane. SDN allows for capabilities, such as network
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access control, to be programmed from a central location for the entire network, allowing a
higher level of efficiency. However, several important questions must be answered to realize
this potential. How do we go about building this type of network? How do we evaluate an
ITACS SDN implementation to see how much more efficient it would be than the current
ITACS implementation?
1.2 Research Questions
The current ITACS network has not been studied for a SDN solution. This thesis researches
the following questions.
1. Does the SDN solution perform better than the current legacy VLAN solution when
it comes to management overhead and knowledge of topology?
2. What are the pros and cons of this integrated approach?
1.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we define network access control. We
break down different protocols and services used in implementing network access control
on ITACS’s network. We then define SDN and its primary parts and discuss related works.
Chapter 3 discusses the high-level design of the replication of ITACS network and the design
of the prototype SDN solution. In Chapter 4, we discuss our methodology, including how
we built and configured the ITACS solution and the SDN solution, along with experiment





In order to investigate the advisability of implementing SDN to improve network oversight
and to reduce vulnerabilities as well as manual configuration, this chapter discusses the
basics of network access control (NAC), including the ways it can be implemented and
currently used protocols and services for doing so. These protocols and services are
media access control (MAC) authentication, 802.1x, remote authentication dial-in user
service (RADIUS), and lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP). We also review
SDN and the different parts of its architecture.
2.1 Network Access Control
NAC is a network solution that uses a group of protocols and services to create policies
that describe what credentials a device needs to join a network for the first time [4]. Some
credentials that a device may need include username and password, required anti-virus
update level, system specific update requirements, or device/MAC address authentication
for printers, servers, or scanners. When users/devices do not meet these requirements, the
NAC solution should deny access to network resources. One question, however, is what
happens when legitimate users need to perform system updates in order to meet a NAC
requirements? This is why remediation strategies exist.
Two of the remediation strategies are quarantine and captive portals [5]. Some NAC solu-
tions quarantine the device using network segmentation and designating a certain network
segment to deny access to the internet and all network resources except those that allow
them, the user or device, to get up-to-date on all requirements to meet minimum policy stan-
dards. If a NAC solution uses the captive portal, it restricts users from accessing anything
on the network and redirects all http/https request to the portal, usually an internal website,
that provides them with the resources to download all updates and software requirements
for them to become policy compliant and be granted access to the network. Some of
the companies that provide what are considered the top NAC solutions (Extreme Works
(Extreme Control), Auconet (BICS), Hewlett Packard Enterprise (ClearPass), ForeScout
(CounterAct)) [6] use 802.1x authentication, network segmentation, MAC authentication,
3
LDAP and an authentication server with various remediation techniques to provide their
solutions [6].
2.2 Types of Access Controls
For this thesis, we consider network segmentation (VLAN), MAC authentication, 802.1x
authentication, RADIUS, and LDAP as possible NAC solutions. We take a deeper look into
these NAC methods.
2.2.1 VLAN
One solution to segmenting networks is to use VLANs. Rather than being separated
by geographic location via physically separate devices (e.g., a network switch), VLANs
are logically separated subnetworks of organizational groups, hosts/users, or devices that
perform the same job functions. VLANs create separate broadcast domains [7]. Broadcast
domains are typically bounded by routers because routers do not forward broadcast frames
[8]. VLANs are the current standard for segmenting networks. VLANs are uniquely
identified by a VLAN identifier (ID). Depending on the switch, the VLAN ID can be any
number between 0-4094 [8]. The role of the VLAN ID is for it to be tagged in layer 2
Ethernet packets for routing purposes. If planned correctly, VLANs provide the desired
logical groupings to perform access control for users and hosts to different applications and
files within a wide area network (WAN) or local area network (LAN). Some other protocols
and services can be leveraged to make VLANs more efficient. One of these services is
MAC authentication.
2.2.2 MAC Authentication
A MAC address is a 48-bit address that is associated with a network interface card (NIC)
to facilitate communication at the data link layer of the protocol stack. MAC addresses
are commonly used in Ethernet and WiFi networks as the data link layer addresses [9].
MAC authentication is an authentication service that uses the MAC address of devices to
gain–or not–access to network services. It is not the most secure, but it does provide a
layer of security. This should not be the only layer of security unless perhaps one running a
small, low risk, home network with a limited number of devices. If one is running a larger
network, implementing other security protocols should be considered. MAC spoofing is
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an issue. Essentially, MAC spoofing entails changing a computer’s MAC address, for any
reason, and it is relatively easy to accomplish [10]. MAC spoofing can be accomplished
by using specific tools that make an operating system (OS) believe its NIC has the MAC
address of the user’s choosing. Implementing the 802.1x protocol can help with this issue.
2.2.3 802.1x
The IEEE standard 802.1x is a standard for passing extensible authentication protocol (EAP)
messages over a wired or wireless LAN [11].
With a standardized EAP, interoperability and compatibility of authentication
methods becomes simpler. For example, when you dial a remote-access server
and use EAP as part of your PPP connection, the RAS doesn’t need to know any
of the details about your authentication system. Only you and the authentication
server have to be coordinated. By supporting EAP authentication, a RAS
server gets out of the business of acting as the middle man, and packages and
repackages EAP packets to hand off to a RADIUS server that does the actual
authentication. [11]
In ITACS’s case, EAP is used with point-to-point protocol (PPP) connections. 802.1x au-
thentication method works between three main device roles: the supplicant (the user/client),
the authenticator, and the authentication server (RADIUS). [11] These three roles usually
execute the protocols in the following order:
1. The supplicant connects to a port of an Ethernet switch.
2. The authenticator (switch) requests a username and password.
3. The authenticator sends the credentials to the authentication server (RADIUS).
4. The authentication server checks the credentials with known credentials in its database
and sends back access granted/denied with required access policies to the authentica-
tor.
5. The authenticator either allows/denies the user based on the reply from the authenti-
cation server.
The authentication server, RADIUS, needs further explaining.
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2.2.4 RADIUS
RADIUS is a protocol built to support the client/server model. The client is typically a
NAS or switch and the server is usually a UNIX/Windows based machine. It can also be
described as a software package/protocol that provides authentication, authorization, and
accounting services [12]. The client receives connection requests from users and sends
their information to the RADIUS server. The RADIUS server checks the user’s credentials,
username and password, and then sends back the configuration information to the client
stating what type of services to give to the user [13], [9]. RADIUS servers are not databases,
though they do utilize databases, such as AD and MySQL, to provide authentication and
authorization services. ITACS uses a Windows Server to provide RADIUS services. The
RADIUS server is configured to use the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to
verify user credentials stored in the AD.
2.2.5 LDAP
LDAP is a software protocol that provides the ability to locate users, organizations,
clients/devices and other resources on the network [14]. The protocol is used to retrieve
and store information on a directory server. The LDAP protocol does not control how
programs function on a client of the server, but transports the messages between the client
and the directory server. LDAP rides over TCP, which means that a TCP session has to be
established for this protocol to work [15]. When trying to authenticate between the server
and client, the bind operation is used. The bind operation allow authentication informa-
tion, sent by LDAP messages, to be exchanged between the server and the client. The
bind operation is broken into three different messages: BindRequest, BindResponse, and
UnbindRequest [16]. A BindRequest message is the initial message sent from the client to
the server. The fields in message are the version, the name, and authentication. The version
field contains the version of LDAP that is being used by the client. There is no negotiation of
this field. If the server does not support the version of LDAP being used by the client, then
the BindResponse from the server will state "protocolError" [16]. The name field contains
the name of the directory object that the client is trying to bind as. It can be a null value
if the client is trying to authenticate anonymously. The authentication field contains the
information used to authenticate like username and password. The BindResponse message
sends back the status of the client’s request to authenticate. If the credentials are accepted
by the server, then the ResultCode in the BindResponse will be set to "success" [16]. The
6
UnbindRequest is a message sent from the client to server to complete the unbind operation.





ResutCode = success, protocolError, etc
LDAP credentials (optional)
Version = version of LDAP
Name = LDAPDN
Authentication = username & password, etc
Bind Operation
Client
Figure 2.1. The Bind Operation Sequence
2.3 Software Defined Networks
One of the characteristics of SDN is separating the control plane from the forwarding plane.
The forwarding plane contains all the logic and tables to deal with forwarding incoming
packets based on networking characteristics, such as MAC addresses, Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses and VLAN IDs [17]. When packets come to the forwarding plane, there are
four ways they can be processed: forward, drop, consume, or replicate. The most basic
functionality would entail a packet coming into the forwarding plane and being forwarded
out the correct port after the address of the packet has been looked up in the forwarding
table. If the packets address is not a part of the current forwarding table, it is consumed by
the forwarding plane and passed on to the control plane for processing. The new forwarding
table created by the control planemust be replicated to the forwarding plane before the packet
can be sent to the proper port on the proper forwarding device. This is usually accomplished
via a multicast sent out to all devices on the forwarding plane. The control plane determines
the logic and algorithms being used and how they are configured at the forwarding plane.
Prior to the development of SDN, the control and forwarding plane functions were always
performed on the same device. By separating the two, the centralized control plane keeps
all of the devices at the forwarding plane in sync, which theoretically eliminates loops [17].
From the concept of creating a separate control plane and forwarding plane, came the idea
of creating a centralized controller. The concept was to remove the thousands of lines of
control plane code [17] from the forwarding devices, thus making them more lightweight
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and agile to perform forwarding duties more quickly.
Conceptually, a SDN is made up of three main parts: SDN devices (switches), a controller,
and applications. SDN devices are at the forwarding plane and contain forwarding func-
tionality for packets. The data that is at each SDN device instructs the device where to
send the packets. The data is represented by flows that are sent from the controller to the
SDN devices [17]. A flow can be described as a list of instructions enumerating what to
do with a group of packets from one end-point to another end-point or multiple end-points.
The endpoints can be defined as IP addresses with TCP/UDP port pair, VLAN IDs and so
on [17]. Flows are unidirectional, meaning that there has to be a flow for each direction
even if it is between the same end-points. A list of flows are contained in a flow table on
each SDN device. If a SDN device receives a packet that does not match a flow in its flow
table, it sends the flow to the controller for instructions. The SDN controller is responsible
for maintaining a current picture of all the SDN devices on its network. The controller also
is responsible for sending this information to its northbound applications. The protocol





Flows Flows Flows Flows
JAVA, PYTHON, REST, etc...
OpenFlow
Figure 2.2. SDN Operations
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2.3.1 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is the open source protocol for SDNs that allows the controller to add, update, or
remove packet flows from the flow tables of SDNdevices. OpenFlow runs over Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP). The controller should be set up to listen on port 6653 for SDN
switches that want to connect [18].
2.3.2 SDN Switches
There are two implementations of SDN devices: software and hardware. The software-
based SDN devices are considered the preferred and easiest of the devices to implement,
because flow tables are easily mapped by using either arrays, hash tables, or dictionary
formats for flows. They are also dynamic in flow table sizing unlike the hardware SDN
devices. The dynamic table growth allowed by software SDN devices means tables can
grow in magnitudes larger than those of hardware SDN devices do to hardware technology
constraints [17]. There are drawbacks though. Because of inefficient programming of search
algorithms, searching through flow tables for software devices may lag when connected to
really fast networks where link speeds can be 1Gbps or higher. Hardware SDN devices
are a lot more efficiently built for quick reference to flow tables [17], [19]. This is why
software SDN devices are typically recommended for small- to medium-sized networks,
as large networks are in greater need of quicker flow table references made possible by
hardware-based SDN devices.
9
Figure 2.3. Software SDN Switch Architecture. Source: [17].
Hardware SDN devices replace packet matching software with specialized hardware. Hard-
ware SDN devices work a lot faster than software SDN devices, which make them better
for performance-sensitive networks such as datacenters and network cores [17]. There are
two types of memory in which flow tables can be stored. Those two types of memory are
content-addressable memory (CAM) and ternary content-addressable memory (TCAM).
CAM is used for precise entries such as MAC addresses, which makes CAM good for layer
2 forwarding tables that is done by layer 2 switches [19]. TCAM is used for more complex
forwarding functions. It accounts for a third state that is considered a wild card. For exam-
ple, if the forwarding table was using IP addresses as its key, there might be multiple entries
that match that IP address. That is where the wild card comes in. If wild card is the subnet
mask, then it narrows down the list of flows in the flow table to send the packets to [17].
TCAM is used for layer 3 switches and routers for this reason [19]. Conventional switches
and routers use random-access memory (RAM) for their flow table look ups because of the
cost-to-speed benefits. CAM and TCAM is faster than RAM [19].
10
Figure 2.4. Hardware SDN Switch Architecture. Source: [17].
2.3.3 Controller
As previously stated, the controller maintains a current view of the entire network along
with controlling policy updates concerning updating packet flow tables, routing, forwarding,
redirecting packets, removing unreachable packet flows and load balancing [17]. Controllers
do all these things in coordination with SDN applications. Controllers are able to com-
municate with these applications through application programming interface (API). These
APIs form the northbound interface. Depending on the type of the controller being used,
the northbound APIs could be implemented in JAVA, PYTHON, REST or many other lan-
guages. Northbound APIs can be low-level interfaces that only account for SDN devices
in a common and more consistent manner [17]. This means that the API accounts for
each SDN device. There are also northbound APIs with high-level interfaces that do not
account for SDN devices at all, but only look at the overall network. Currently there is
not a standard for northbound APIs for SDN controllers [17]. Many vendors are producing
their own versions of SDN controller software. Some of those are OpenDayLight (ODL),




802.1x port-based authentication provides a layer of reliable security for wired and wireless
networks. Johan Loos wrote a paper on a wired implementation that walks you through his
setup of 802.1x usingWindowsServer 2008 and 2012 [21]. He talks about the configurations
of the domain controller (DC), AD, domain name server (DNS), certificate authority
(CA) and dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) on Windows Server 2008 and
network policy server (NPS) on Windows Server 2012 as a RADIUS server. He also
describes the authentication process in great detail and with the authentication protocols:
protected extensible authentication protocol (PEAP), acEAP-MSCHAPv2, and PEAP-EAP-
MSCHAPv2 [21]. PEAP creates a secure tunnel connection between the authentication
server and the client and then a EAP negotiation takes place between the client and the server.
That is the major difference between the two. EAP-MSCHAPv2 authentication uses a
password to authenticate and verified certificate chain. Combining these two authentication
methods creates a secure tunnel established between the authentication server and client
before passing the password for authentication. This combination of symmetric (password)
and asymmetric (public and private keys) results in a protocol that is more secure than the
two being used separately.
Building off of the 802.1x authentication wired implementation, our goal was to build a
SDN 802.1x implementation that is competitive with, or outperforms it. Kamal Benzekki
et al. took this concept and created a hybrid implementation where they removed the
authentication process from the control plane and put it on the data plane to see if it would
improve performance on a 802.1x authentication SDN network [22]. They studied different
SDN and SDN-like networks to come up with their concept, such as:
• flow-based network access control (FlowNAC), which authenticates on the basis of
flow nature [23].
• authentication flow (AuthFlow) which is an authentication and access control mech-
anism that is based on IEEE 802.1X and uses credentials in order to verify a host
identity and determine the privileges using a POX controller, an authenticator and an
authentication server [24].
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• Flex access management system, which is based on OpenFlow and uses virtual
network group ID (GID)s instead of VLANs for its access management mechanism.
The GIDs are managed by access management function (AMF) that is a function on
the OpenFlow controller. Clients are authenticate byMAC address via RADIUS [25].
• Access Control System for Wireless LAN roaming, the authors suggest new informa-
tion for service provider’s policy for the eduroam system that relies on 802.1x and a
hierarchy of RADIUS proxies [26].
From these studies, they created to two implementations that they could test and analyze
efficiency based on authentication latency and compare results. One was a conventional
SDN network as shown in Figure 2.5 where the DHCP, RADIUS and AD servers are
connected to the same OpenFlow switch as the controller. The other implementation has
the DHCP, AD and RADIUS servers connected to a conventional switch that is connected
to an OpenFlow switch that is connected to the controller as shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.5. Conventional SDN Implementation. Source: [22].
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Figure 2.6. Conventional Switch Implementation. Source: [22].
The results from their study show that even when you put the authentication process on the
data plane, in this case a conventional switch, it did not speed up the authentication process
on SDNs. Placing your authentication process as close to the SDN controller as possible




In this chapter, we discuss why we decided to create a replication of ITACS current network
solution. We also discuss the design considerations for the SDN solution, which solution
we chose, and why we decided to go with that solution.
3.1 Design Considerations
The goal of this thesis was to evaluate how SDN can improve network access control
for ITACS. In order to evaluate this, the thesis built two types of networks in order to
gain a better understanding of what configurations are necessary to implement and deploy
all the devices and services needed to run their existing 802.1x authentication method.
That information provides important design considerations for building our SDN prototype
network for testing. SDN uses a different data communication protocol, OpenFlow, than
the current ITACS solution. OpenFlow is the communication protocol that allows the
SDN controller to interact with the forwarding plane network devices such as switches and
routers [18]. In an ideal experimental environment, we would test a full replication of the
current ITACS network and an SDN network at a similar scale to provide the most accurate
data to ITACS. Due to research constraints, there were some design considerations and
abbreviations of both networks that are in the following sections.
3.2 Replication of the ITACS Solution
Before we make any design choices, we must first a take a closer look at what ITACS uses
for its current setup. As described by Mike Williams of the ITACS network operations
center (NOC), the ITACS unclassified network infrastructure has 139 edge switch stacks
on their network and a total of 339 switches configured in these stacks. In each stack,
there are between one and eleven switches. Each switch stack acts as one switch. The
edge switches being use by ITACS are Ruckus ICX7450 with 48 copper ports (see Figure
A.1). The ITACS unclassified network has ten distribution switch stacks that are made of
two Ruckus ICX7750 switches with 48 fiber SFP+ ports (see Figure A.2). There are two
Extreme MXLe-8 routers (see Figure A.3) in a cluster to form one inside router and two
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Extreme MXLe-4 routers (see Figure A.4) in a cluster to form one outside router. There
is one Palo Alto PA7050 firewall between the inside and outside routers (see Figure A.5).
There are three Dell servers running Windows Server 2012 R2 Datacenter as AD servers,
and there are two Dell servers running Window Server 2008 R2 Datacenter as RADIUS
servers. ITACS uses Window NPS for RADIUS services [27].
Figure 3.1 shows the ITACS network building diagram of Glasgow Hall. To save time and
resources, we chose to only emulate this (GlasgowHall) network segment, and the emulation
includes one Cisco router as the inside router and one Brocade switch (as illustrated in
Figure 3.2). The Dell server runs an AD server, a DHCP server, and a RADIUS server.
This design only emulates one building of the ITACS network topology. The data that
we collected did not require Internet access; therefore, we did not need to establish an
Internet connection. ITACS currently runs Windows Server 2012. Because there is a newer
version available, Windows Server 2016, we decided to use that version to see if there were
any differences/challenges on our smaller test bed. This simplifies by only evaluating the
authentication methods and VLAN implementation, which eliminates the need to provide
other network security practices implemented by ITACS in their actual network. This
streamlines the emulation and speeds up its development and evaluation. Conversely, not
implementing the full network configuration may positively or negatively affect the network
performance.
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Figure 3.1. Current ITACS Network Topology Showing Details of One 









Figure 3.2. ITACS Network Emulation
3.3 Design of SDN Solution
When designing a SDN solution for ITACS, we must consider certain factors that are key
in building a network. This thesis focused on robustness, scalability, and cost.
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We measure network robustness based on how well a network can maintain functionality
when it loses links and nodes or is attacked [28]. We must take into account robustness
for ITACS’s network because of the number of users, the different types of research,
and the critical files and database servers that ITACS hosts. Their network hosts distance
learners, on-campus students who are using wireless connections, and the staff connectivity.
Robustness is critical.
Scalability is the ability of the network to grow and manage its increased demand [29].
ITACS;s network is based on education and research, which means it must be able to adjust
to constant change in the number of users as well as the amount of bandwidth used by each
user. Although the number of students and staff is fairly consistent, the number of services
and applications needed by students and staff are increasing rapidly. A push for web-based
services and applications via the cloud to keep up with demand and scalability is inevitable.
SDN architecture provides the resource and storage allocation necessary for cloud-based
services to handle the scalability of high demand networks.
Cost is always critical. However, when it comes to Department of Defense (DoD) networks,
it is even more important because of budget constraints. Making changes to the network
have to be planned carefully within the budget. With networking and cloud technologies
evolving at a rapid pace, one needs a network technology that is built with future expansion
in mind. Finding ways to build the network with the right equipment and software while not
making too many performance sacrifices is the key. SDN excels at providing the capability
to grow at a relatively low cost.
For this thesis, the recommendation for ITACS’s SDN-based access control solution is to
keep the top level of the campus network the same all the way to the campus distribution
switch. At the building distribution switch, we place the SDN controller software on a
computer/server. The distribution switch connects to the OpenFlow edge switches for
hosts/devices to connect to the network.
We chose to treat each building as its own LAN that has its own primary SDN controller
that manages the flows and devices on its network, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. This SDN
network design allows for management of scalability at the building level. For backup
purposes and robustness, each building could use another buildings SDN controller as its
secondary controller for failover and load-balancing. This design would also use most of
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the current network implementation, which lessens the cost of the network upgrade. This
solution provides distributed access control for each LAN that is connected to the campus
backbone network.
Figure 3.3. Proposed SDN Design: Incremental Deployment at Building
Level
To prove that this solution benefits ITACS, without us having to build out an entire building-
sized LAN, we decided to concentrate on only the core components of a building LAN. We
considered two possible implementations for this experiment.
The first SDN implementation consideration builds on the ITACS implementation that we
created. The key element of this implementation plan is to reuse as much as possible
from the network created as shown in Figure 3.2. It would require adding on a OpenFlow
compatible switch connected to the authentication server and a SDN controller connected
to the OpenFlow switch as shown in Figure 3.4. The problems that we ran into were getting
compatible switches and SDN controllers within the time frame available. The brocade
ICX 7750 switch is OpenFlow enabled, but not easily made compatible with the ONOS
SDN controller that we have chosen.
ONOS is one of the leading open source SDN controllers available [30]. ONOS provides the
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control plane for a SDN to manage network devices and provides software applications and
modules that provide communication to hosts and across multiple networks [30]. ONOS
has been heavily developed and provides applications for many use cases. One of those use
cases is 802.1x authentication with its authorization, authentication and accounting (AAA)
application. The AAA application was developed in ONOS version 1.10 for use by Central
Offices Re-architected as Datacenters (CORD). CORD is a community-based open source
project that is built over ONOS to create telecommunication Central Office datacenter
solutions [31].
Figure 3.4. First ITACS SDN Implementation Consideration
The second possible design implementation to consider is a partial or simulated implemen-
tation of the SDN solution. The pros of this type of implementation are going to be time
and cost. With a partial/simulated implementation, we are able to cut time depending on
the parts of the network configuration that are simulated. Also, those same considerations
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in the implementation positively affect the cost. The cons are the exact opposite of the first
design consideration: not a full-scale model of the network and the data collected may not
be as reliable as it would be in a full-scale SDN operational model. The data analysis has
to take into account what has been simulated when presenting results, which in turn affects
the decision of moving forward with a full-scale operational implementation.
The partial/simulated implementation was the best direction to go for this thesis due to time
constraints and costs being the driving factors [32], [33]. The SDN controller we decided
to use was the ONOS controller. We used FreeRadius as the authentication server and
MININET to simulate the hosts and OpenFlow switches as shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5. Experimental Implementation
3.4 Evaluation Criteria
We evaluate network access control for the ITACS emulation as follows.
• The switch requests the authentication credentials from the host.
• The switch sends the authentication credentials to RADIUS.
• RADIUS verifies hosts credentials for authentication and reply with accept or deny.
• If the authentication is accepted, the host is placed on the authenticated users VLAN
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and given an IP address from the DHCP scope of the DHCP server.
• If the authentication fails, the host is placed on the restricted remediation VLAN.
We evaluate network access control for the SDN test environment as follows.
• The switch sends the request to ONOS.
• ONOS sends the authentication request to FreeRADIUS using its AAA application.
• FreeRADIUS verifies hosts credentials for authentication and reply with accept or
deny.
• If the authentication is accepted, ONOS adds a flow to the flow table for the host.
• If the authentication fails, ONOS does not add a flow for the host.
We also evaluate the SDN solution based on how other key benefits perform compared to
the current ITACS solution. Those features are discussed in the following sections.
3.4.1 Expected Benefits of SDN
Some of the expected benefits of SDN functionality are service speed and agility, flexibility
and holistic management, granular security, efficiency(configuration complexity) and lower
operating expenses, and lower hardware expenditures [34], [35] .
Service Speed and Agility
Building networks in a SDN architecture using virtual machine (VM)s can be a lot faster that
most physical networks. Creating VM instances takes less time than building and adding
physical hosts to the network [34].
Holistic Management
On SDN architectures, devices and can be added and removed without the limits that
simple network management protocol (SNMP) imposes on networks. This allows for
experimentation to be done on your live network without causing degradation of the entire
network [34]. Enterprise networks need to add applications and devices on demand for their
customers and processing requests such as big data. SDN manages physical and virtual
devices from the central controller and also provides a central management console for
managing physical and virtual devices via a set of built-in APIs [35].
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Granular Security
With networks constantly adding and removing devices, it has become increasingly more
difficult to apply firewall and content filtering policies throughout the network. Then,
taking into account that most networks allow users to bring their own devices to connect to
the network, it creates more security policy distribution issues. SDN, on the other hand,
provides a centralized controller that can distribute all network and security policies from a
central location. Such centralized control would thus help this increasingly difficult security
management problem [34], [35].
Configuration Complexity
Configuration complexity can be evaluated by comparing how SDN is built to have central-
ized configuration and control from the SDN controller for the entire network. Most network
configurations may be performed and even automated on a small number of controllers.
The devices on the forwarding plane receive all their instructions from the controller. You
can add or remove devices without any more configurations being needed. This is one
of the primary features of SDN architecture that make it so appealing to replace current
network solutions. Right now, ITACS has to configure each device individually when they
add a new device (e.g., switch, router, or firewall) to the network. Adding new devices may
also cause ITACS to have to change some configurations on their current devices as well
because of vendor specific compatibility issues.
Hardware and Operational Costs
The current ITACS solution uses one vendor, Brocade, for their network devices. Being
locked in to a vendor because of vendor-specific features and the vendor not being easily
compatible with other vendors, makes it hard to make choices based on cost instead of
convenience. With SDN architecture, you can go with the cheapest available devices
because compatibility is not an issue. You can also use open source software to create





In this chapter, we explain what hardware and software configuration choices were made
and why. Then we present the main experimental results of the thesis. The configuration
details of the experimentation can be viewed in Appendix A.3.
4.1 ITACS Implementation
The ITACS experimental setup includes one Dell server, one Cisco router, three Brocade
switches and three Dell workstations. For this setup to work, we made sure that the server,
router, and switches were all on the same VLAN.
ITACS Experimental Solution
Hardware Software Role
Dell GCNVX12 Server Windows Server 2016 DC, DNS, CA, DHCP, NPS
Dell Optiplex 9020 Windows 10 clients
Cisco Router Cisco 2811 Distribution Switch
Brocade Switches Brocade ICX 6450 Edge Switches
4.1.1 Windows Server
On our Dell GCNVX12 Server, we have installed Windows Server 2016. As part of the
Windows Server suite, we have installed AD as our user database provider and DC, NPS
to use as RADIUS, DHCP for IP address assignment and CA to provide certificates for
authentication.
Active Directory
In AD, we need to create our security groups for authenticated users and computers. These
have to be defined for us to add user accounts to these security groups so we can create
network policies in NPS for the authentication and network resource access purposes [12].
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Certificate Authority
We needed AD CS certification authority (CA) installed to automatically enroll a server
certificate to all of our NPS servers and to send client computers CA certificates. These CA
certificates are stored on each client computer and in the Root Trusted Certificate Authorities
store. The certificate allows the client computer to perform 802.1x authentication by sending
its certificate to the edge switch, then sends the certificate to NPS server for verification to
see if the computer is trusted [21], [12].
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
We decided to use DHCP on the server instead of using the cisco router because of the
centralized configuration and maintenance capabilities. We also chose Windows Server
for this role because it simplifies the configuration process and ITACS uses the same
configuration setup.
Network Policy Server
We are deployingNPS as RADIUS server. The brocade switches are configured as RADIUS
clients. NPS is configured to talk to the switches to authenticate client computers. A
connection request policy is created to allow the RADIUS clients to talk to the RADIUS
server [21]. Then, we configure Network Policies that include more details for how to
authenticate users and computers. We configure our Network Policies to use certificate
based PEAP authentication for 802.1x and PAP for MAC authentication [12]. We followed
the following steps from Implementing IEEE 802.1x for Wired Networks paper by Johan
Loos [21]:
4.1.2 VLANs
For our ITACS solution, we have two VLANs, a restricted VLAN for users who fail to
authenticate and a VLAN for authenticated users and devices.
VLAN ID Description location
2 Native VLAN Distribution switch
308 Authenticated user VLAN Edge switches
222 Restricted VLAN Edge switches
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Native VLAN
On the Cisco router we configured VLAN 2 as the native VLAN with trunk mode encap-
sulation Enabled and to allow all VLANs for the four FastEthernet interfaces (fa 0/0/0-fa
0/0/3). This configuration allows un-tagged passing through the router interfaces to tagged
as VLAN 2 traffic since that is the native VLAN, but it allows all other traffic tagged for
any other VLAN to pass through as well. The following configuration was used to create












router(config-if)#switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q
router(config-if)# switchport trunk native vlan 5




Authenticated and Restricted VLAN
First, let us discuss how to configure VLANs on brocade switches. Similar to Cisco
switches, we have to declare/initialize VLANs individually. Where things start to differ is
when we get to how we assign interfaces to the VLANs. Instead of going to each interface
and tagging the VLAN, we go to the VLAN and tag or un-tag the interfaces. When we
un-tag an interface to a VLAN, that means all un-tagg edged traffic that comes through that
interface gets tagged to that VLAN by default. If we tag an interface to a specific VLAN,
that means that VLAN is allowed on that interface. An interface can be tagged by multiple
VLANs, but can only be un-tagged by one VLAN. To allow both tagged and un-tagged
traffic over an interface we have to configure the interface for dual-mode, which is the
equivalent of putting an interface in trunk mode with a native VLAN on cisco devices. We
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configured our interface 1/1/48 for dual-mode on VLAN 308 and tagged on VLAN 222.




switch(config-vlan-308)#tag int eth 1/1/48
switch(config-vlan-308)#exit









We configure flex authentication on the Brocade switches. Thismeans thatMAC and 802.1x
authentication are configured on the switches. MAC authentication takes precedence over
802.1x authentication. If a host’s MAC is accepted, then 802.1x does not get used. If MAC
authentication fails, the host gets prompted to enter credentials for 802.1x authentication.
If host/user is able to authenticate, they are placed on VLAN 308. If a user fails to
authenticate with 802.1x authentication, the host is put into the restricted VLAN. The
switch configurations for this authentication method are shown below. All other switch











switch(config-authen)#dot1x enable eth 1/1/1 to 1/1/47
switch(config-authen)#mac-authentication enable
switch(config-authen)#mac-authentication enable eth 1/1/1 to 1/1/47




switch(config)#aaa authentication dot1x default radius
switch(config)#aaa authentication login default radius local
switch(config)#aaa authentication login privilege-mode






Now that we have implemented our ITACS experimental solution, we have to test the
network to make sure it is fully functional. The following scenarios are to validate that the
ITACS experimental solution is performing the network access control configurations as
intended.
Scenario One
A client computer fails MAC authentication and is trying to connect using 802.1x authen-
tication.
Scenario Two
A client computer trying to authenticate and fails MAC authentication and 802.1x authen-
tication. Consequently, the client computer is placed on the restricted VLAN.
4.1.4 Results
After running through both scenarios, we see that both were successful from the screenshot
of the Switch1 (shown in Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1. Screenshot of Edge Switch Showing VLAN Placement after
Authentication Attempts
Scenario One Results
Two client computers, PC1 and PC2, successfully authenticated via 802.1x are showing
that they are on the appropriate VLAN for authenticated users, 308 (as shown in Figure
4.1). PC1 and PC2 have received their IP addresses from the DHCP scope provided by our
DHCP server (as shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
Figure 4.2. IP Address Assigned by DHCP to PC1
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Figure 4.3. IP Address Assigned by Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) to PC2
Scenario Two Results
Wecan see that when the client computer failed authentication, it was placed on the restricted
VLAN 222 as expected (as shown in Figure 4.1). Because the computer was placed in the
restricted VLAN, it was assigned an IP address (as shown in Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4. No IP Address Assigned to PC3
Configuration Complexity
The ITACS test implementation required over two hundred lines of configuration code for
each of the three switches and about a hundred lines of configuration code for the router.
With Brocade switches, they can be configured in stacks. This means that we only have to
manually configure the master switch in the stack and the other switches automatically copy
those configurations. There are 139 switch stacks on the ITACS unclassified network [27].
SwitchStacks ∗ LinesO f Code = TotalLinesO f Code
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139 ∗ 200 = 27, 800 (4.1)
That means the administrator would have to manually input about 30,000 lines of configu-
rations in across many different locations which takes a lot of time as well.
Operational Costs
As stated in Section 3.2, there are 339 switches on ITACS network. Those switches are
either a Brocade ICX 7750 ($2,795.00 used to $13,985.49 brand new) or 7450 ($245.97
used to $7,137.40 brand new) [37], [38], [39], [40]. The cost of the switches for their
network could have cost them up to $4,741,243.83.
4.2 SDN Implementation
The implementation that we are implementing is from a case study done by ONOS de-
velopers using the AAA application from CORD to negotiate authentication requests with
FreeRADIUS as the authentication server [31]. Although we did configure the authentica-
tion for this implementation, we are only testing ONOS for completeness of functionality,
configuration complexity and operational costs to see if the SDN solution is a good fit to
replace ITACS’s current network solution. All the installation and configuration details can
be viewed in Appendix A.4.
4.2.1 Experimental Scenario
We built a SDN with switch and three hosts in MININET connected to a remote ONOS
controller. From this build, we are able to view the complete network topology fromONOS’s
topology management view feature. From there we can view the low-level management
information such as MAC addresses, port numbers and VLANs.
4.2.2 Results
The SDN was successfully built with MININET and ONOS. We view the topology in the
web browser (as shown in Figure 4.5). This is a demonstration of the holistic management
feature of ONOS displaying the network devices that are currently connected.
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Figure 4.5. ONOS Topology View
From this same view, we can view the MAC and IP addresses by clicking on the host
device as shown in Figure 4.6. We can also see what VLAN the device is on if VLANs are
configured. We can also see the port the device is connected on the switch when we click
on the link between the two devices as shown in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.6. Low-Level Management Information from Host
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Figure 4.7. Low-Level Management Information from Link
Configuration Complexity
Configuring the SDN solution took much less time than the ITACS network solution. Be-
cause the virtual OpenFlow switch on the SDN solution receives all forwarding information
from SDN controller, ONOS, and its applications, we only had to do configurations once.




One of the best parts about a SDN solution is that a lot of the software is free and open
source. This means we can reuse hardware that we already have available and download the
compatible SDN software for the switches and the controllers free of additional costs. There
are virtual OpenFlow switch solutions available as well so we don’t have to use relatively
expensive physical switches in our implementation of a SDN solution.
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CHAPTER 5:
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we present our conclusions from this thesis research and outline several
areas of future work.
5.1 Conclusions
The current VLAN based network access control used by ITACS cannot keep track of
all devices connected to the network, which allows unauthorized devices to possibly be
connected and go unnoticed. We experimented with SDN technology to determine if it
provided amore efficient solution to this problem. The results show that SDNnot only is able
tomaintain the same level of network access control but also provides network administrators
an accurate view of device level topology. For any network device connecting to a SDN, the
controller will have knowledge of and therefore be able to produce an accurate automated
topology view of the entire LAN. This decreases management overhead significantly.
TheSDNsolution’s configuration complexity compared to the current ITACS solutionwould
save network administrators and operators a lot of working hours when switches and other
devices need to be added or removed. This type of configuration is possible because SDN’s
centralized programming design provides the flexibility to increase or decrease in size as
needed without more configuration at the forwarding plane level. The availability of open
source SDN software may also help lower operational costs and hardware costs. Network
administrators can also lower hardware costs by choosing the lowest cost switches available
to implement their SDNarchitecturewithout being trapped into vendor proprietary switches.
This does depend on the on the SDN controller chosen by the network administrator.




SDN controller security should be considered a priority when using open source software
in a network operations environment. Network intruders have access to the same software
we do and can easily take down or take control of the network if they are able to get
to the controller. Building a full SDN solution would provide us with the results to
compare both network implementations properly. More time to plan and select the right
combination of SDN controller, switches and software would make for a smoother install
and implementation. From the research and troubleshooting, we learned that this is still a
very new technology and some vendors are not compatible or simple to use with certain
SDN controllers. Doing more research to figure out what devices work well together or
what requirements for the devices to work well together ahead of time would fix a lot of
these problems that we ran into.
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APPENDIX: Hardware and Software Configuration
Details
A.1 Hardware
Figure A.1. Ruckus ICX7450 48 Port Switch. Source: [1].
Figure A.2. Ruckus ICX7750 48 Fiber Port Switch
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Figure A.3. Extreme MXLe-8 Router. Source: [2].
Figure A.4. Extreme MXLe-4 Router. Source: [2].
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vlan 222 name Remediation by port
tagged ethe 1/1/48
!
vlan 254 name DEFAULT-VLAN by port
no spanning-tree
!
vlan 301 name ADMIN by port
tagged ethe 1/1/48
!















dot1x enable ethe 1/1/1 to 1/1/47
mac-authentication enable
mac-authentication enable ethe 1/1/1 to 1/1/47
mac-authentication password-override 1 *********
mac-authentication dot1x-override
!
aaa authentication web-server default radius local
aaa authentication dot1x default radius
aaa authentication login default radius local





ip icmp burst-normal 5000 burst-max 10000 lockup 300
ip tcp burst-normal 10 burst-max 100 lockup 300
ip address 172.20.42.107 255.255.255.224
ip dns domain-list VinceLab.vincelab.com





radius-server host 172.20.42.110 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 authentication-only key 2 *************** dot1x
!
!





































































































































































































































































A.3 ITACS Implementation Setup
This is how we setup DHCP:
• Open DHCP Console from Administrative Tools, right click on IPv4 and select New
Scope
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• On the Welcome to the New Scope Wizard page, click Next
• On the Scope Name page, type a name for the scope and click Next
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• On the IP Address Range page, specify Start and End IP address. Also specify the
correct subnet mask and click Next
• On the Add Exclusions page, click Next
• On the Lease Duration page, specify a lease duration and click Next
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• On the Configure DHCP Option page, select No, I will configure these options later
and click Next
• On the Completing the New Scope Wizard page, click Finish




We are deployingNPS as RADIUS server. The brocade switches are configured as RADIUS
clients. NPS will be configured to talk to the switches to authenticate client computers. A
connection request policy is created to allow the RADIUS clients to talk to the RADIUS
server [21]. Then, we configure Network Policies that include more details for how to
authenticate users and computers. We configure our Network Policies to use certificate-
based PEAP authentication for 802.1x and PAP for MAC authentication [12]. We followed
the following steps from Implementing IEEE 802.1x for Wired Networks paper by Johan
Loos [21]:
Configure RADIUS Client on NPS Server
• Open Network Policy Server from Administrative Tools, expand RADIUS Clients
and Servers, right click on RADIUS Clients
• On the New RADIUS Client dialog box, specify a friendly name and IP address
• Specify a Shared Secret
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• Click on Advanced, uncheck or check the required options
• Click OK
Configure Connection Request Policy
• From the Network Policy Server Console, right click on Connection Request Policies
and select New
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• On the Specify Connection Request Policy Name and Connection Type page, type a
name for the policy and click Next
• On the Specify Conditions page, click Add. Select NAS Port Type and click Add.
Then check Ethernet under Common 802.1X connection tunnel types.
• Click OK and click Next
53
• On the Specify Connection Request Forwarding page Click Next
• On the Specify Authentication Methods page click Next
• On the Configure Settings page click Next
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• Click Finish
Configure Network Policy 802.1x Users
• From the Network Policy Server Console, right click on Network Policies and select
New
• On the Specify Network Policy Name and Connection Type page, type a name for the
policy and click Next
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• From the Select Conditions dialog box, select NAS Port Type (Ethernet) and click
Add
• From the Select Condition dialog box, add the following Windows Groups: "What
ever your users group is" and click Next
• On the Specify Access Permissions page, select Access Granted and click Next
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• On the Select EAP dialog box, select Microsoft: Protected EAP (PEAP)
• On the Configure Constraints page, click Next
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• On the Configure Settings page click Next
• On the Completing New Network Policy page click Finish
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A.3.1 Dell Workstations
Configuring Windows 10 client for 802.1x Authentication
• Navigate to Control Panel > Administrative > Services. Then from the list of services,
right click on Wired AutoConfig and select Properties




• In the Control Panal open Network and sharing Center, and select Change adapter
settings
• Right click on Local Area Connection and select Properties
• Select Authentication tab and select Enable IEEE 802.1X authentication
• Clear Remember my credentials for this connection each time I’m logged on and
Fallback to unauthorized network access
• On the Choose a network authentication method list box, select Microsoft: Protected
EAP (PEAP) and click Settings
• From the Select Authentication Method list box, select Secured password (EAP or
MSCHAP v2) certificate and click OK
60
• Click Additional Settings, select Specify authentication mode and select User or
Computer authentication from the list
• Click OK
A.4 SDN Installation and Setup
ONOS Installation
The ONOS install looks to install in the "/opt" directory on your workstation. These
directions are locate on the ONOS wiki page [30], but we will walk through them as well:
• There shouldn’t be a directory by that name by default, so the first thing we need to
do is make the "/opt" directory and move to that directory.
sudo mkdir /opt
cd /opt
• Download ONOS from website
sudo wget -c http://downloads.onosproject.org/release/onos-1.14.0.tar.gz
• Extract the ONOS archive into the "/opt" directory
sudo tar xzf onos-1.14.0.tar.gz
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• Move the extracted directory to "onos" sudo mv onos-1.14.0 onos
How to Run ONOS
• To run or stop ONOS, you have to navigate to the "/opt/onos/bin" directory
./onos-service start or ./onos-service stop
• Once you start ONOS you will see the ONOS logo on your command line interface
(CLI)




• The following will show up in the browser. The username is "onos" and the password
is "rocks"
• Once you log in, you will get a graphic user interface (GUI) that displays your current
network topology. It should be empty for the moment
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ONOS Applications
One of SDN’s advantages over legacy networks are their programmability. With ONOS,
you get a considerable amount of applications built in from previous developers so you
don’t have to recreate some of the most general use cases, such as setting up flows for hosts.
One application that we want to use that was not installed was the AAA application. It was
built on CORD and since CORD is built on top of ONOS technology, we can add it into
our ONOS build.
• Once you download the AAA application snapshot from github, you will use the
following command to upload the application into ONOS
onos-app 172.17.0.1<-"this is ONOS IP address by default" install <path to "aaa-1.2-SNAPSHOT.oar">
• Then we need to supply the AAA application with RADIUS configuration, so we
create a aaa-conf.json file to provide the information. Because RADIUS will be setup













• Then we upload the aaa-conf.json file to ONOS
onos-netcfg 172.17.0.1 aaa-conf.json
• You can view the apps available on your ONOS controller by running the following
command from CLI
apps -a
• You can also run this command to see what apps you have running
apps -a -s
• Or you can view all your apps, active or not active, from the web browser by clicking
on the menu button in the top left corner of your browser
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• Then click on "Applications" from the menu
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A.4.1 Mininet
Mininet will be used to simulate our hosts and switches for our SDN implementation. It
allows for flexible and quick topology building and testing.
Installation
Run the following command to install Mininet
sudo apt-get install mininet
Topology Setup
A network topology refers to the layout or arrangement of network communication devices
(nodes, links, etc.) [41]. We are creating a simple topology that will include one open
vswitch and three hosts. They will connect to the ONOS controller remotely on port 6633.
sudo mn --topo=tree,1,3 --controller=remote,ip=172.17.0.1:6633 --mac
Once you build this topology, you will need to ping all hosts to create flows.
pingallfull
You will then be able to view the topology in the web browser on ONOS.
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A.4.2 FreeRADIUS
For FreeRADIUS, we have to install the software, configure EAP as our authentication
method, create certificates with the built in CA and create a user account.
Installation
Run the following command to install FreeRADIUS
sudo apt-get install freeradius
Configuration
We are going to walk through the configuration files that need to be altered for us to use
EAP authentication for FreeRADIUS.




• Since the workstation is the client, the client will be localhost and the IP address will
be 127.0.0.1
• Make sure you change the shared secret password. Since this is a closed test bed, we
will keep simple for easy configuration purposes.
• Next, navigate to the users file to add a user
• Add a user and password
• Navigate to EAP file to configure settings
cd /etc/freeradius/3.0/mods-available
nano eap
• In the EAP file, change the default EAP type from MD5 to TLS
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• Under "tls-config tls-common" section, change the "private key password".
• Navigate to the etc/freeradius/3.0/certs directory
• In the certs directory, there are three files that need to updated; server.cnf file, ca.cnf
and client.cnf. Change the "input password" and "output password" in all of those
files.
How to Run FreeRADIUS
To run RADIUS you will use the following command
sudo freeradius -X
When you run this command the first time, it will create your certificates for the server,
client and CA. You will need to move a copy of the ca.pem, client.pem and client.key to






WPA-Supplicant is an implementation of the WPA supplicant that runs on your host work-
station. It allows you simulate WPA key negotiation with a WPA authenticator and EAP
authentication with an authentication server. To use theWPA-supplicant program, you have
to create a wpa-supplicant configuration file with the authentication method, username and
password, and certificates depending on the authentication method being used. Since we
are using EAP-TLS, this is the configuration that was created.
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